by
Shandon L.
Guthrie
4. THE FUTILITY OF TRADITIONAL VALUES WITHOUT GOD
5. CONCLUSION
As a new millennium dawns, there are still millions of individuals that continue their intellectual and emotional pilgrimages to find the meaning of life. It is often difficult to pose the question seriously in order to warrant a formidable answer when the "meaning of life" is taunted as the wrong approach. But what, in fact, do we mean when we ask the question, "What is the meaning of life?" Typically, the layperson seeks to find their niche in society either through a sense of accomplishment or through a sense of contribution. Thus people desire to determine the meaning of their lives and not the mere abstract notion of "life" as existence. Philosophers throughout the ages have approached the question from an intellectual perspective. It is my endeavor to elucidate the great Existentialist movement and its contribution to the intellectual approach in attempting to find out the meaning to this human predicament. I believe that an analysis of existentialism, with its aversion to theism, reveals that without God there can be no objective utility for the philosopher or the layperson.
It is difficult to pigeonhole existentialism as a singular thought because there are a variety of approaches to the issues relating to self-purpose. The Quincy Lee Centennial Professor of Philosophy, Robert C. Solomon, suggests that existentialism is an attitude that perceives the existentialist individual as contemplating the "philosophical realization of self-consciousness." (1) In an explicit portrait of the human predicament, Solomon remarks that existentialism's attitude
recognizes the unresolvable confusion of the human world, yet resists
the all-too-human temptation to resolve the confusion by grasping
toward whatever appears or can be made to appear firm or familiar -
reason, God, nation, authority, history, work, tradition, or the "other-
worldly," whether of Plato, Christianity, or utopian fantasy. (2)
The human predicament evinced by existentialism is the "unresolvable confusion" bathed in a cornucopia of ideas and attempted resolutions. John Dewey would later address this pursuit as the quest for certainty. (3) Although existentialism recognizes the futility of solving the question of life's meaning, its endeavor is surely to engross oneself in the search.
There is a second element in the existential pursuit. This element is freedom. Existentialists, especially the notable Jean-Paul Sartre, have enunciated freedom as paramount for decisions of personal decision-making. Concerning the importance of freedom, Robert Solomon writes:
According to many existentialists, every act and every attitude must
be considered a choice. Yet the existential attitude itself is apparently
not chosen. One finds oneself in it. (4)
Thus the human predicament, the problem of the self in a world asking that pressing question about life's meaning, is itself not a matter of choice. However, in such a world where the individual is truly an individual (that is, she is devoid of any external constraints - any objective values, religious influence, or ethical duties) there are choices that can be made unhindered by what others think one should think and do. I think that the threads of existentialism can be summed up by Professor Solomon's words:
A threat of imminent death - or even a passing thought of our own
mortality - is sufficient to wrench us out of our current involvements,
even if but for a moment, and force us to look at our lives. (5)
Some of the philosophers we shall consider in this essay are not a part of the well-known existentialist movement embraced by Sartre, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and others. (6) However, I believe that their philosophies, whether idealism or phenomenology, are attempts at pursuing the escape from the human predicament.
G. W. F. Hegel (b. 1770)
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany in 1770. At eighteen, Hegel won a scholarship that invited him to pursue theological studies at Tübingen University. Concerning his graduation from Tübingen in 1793, Professors Walter Kaufmann and Walter Baird note:
The work Hegel submitted to his professors at the university gave no
indication of the brilliant philosophical career that was to follow. In
fact, his diploma read from the university recorded that his knowledge
of theology was fair, but his knowledge of philosophy was inadequate. (7)
Hegel then lived a life of writing, tutoring, and teaching and eventually joining his close friend Schelling at the University of Jena. However, when Hegel published his The Phenomenology of Mind which attacked Schelling's ideas then their friendship soon came to an end. Having exhausted his wealth inherited from his deceased father, Hegel became a newspaper editor and eventually was offered the chair of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. He then moved to the University of Berlin where his fame was established in Europe. (8)
G. W. F. Hegel is not a part of the properly categorized existential movement, but his ideas certainly influenced those who later would be. Hegel's philosophy stems from the schism between Kantian Idealism and British Empiricism. Kant had suggested that there exists both a phenomenal world (an empirically verifiable reality) and an unknowable noumenal world (the actual reality of the empirical world). Hegel developed a "dialectic" that would perceive two competing philosophies and find their "synthesis" or the unity of the two. This view was erected to demonstrate the reality of consciousness. On a global level, the notion of consciousness (which Hegel calls Geist) could be understood as a universal Ego intimated with every individual ego. Robert Solomon explains their relationship:
Geist abstracts from the peculiarities of individuals and focuses attention
on their similarities: Geist is a convenient way of talking about the
common properties of a society, of a people, or of all people while
ignoring, but not denying, their differences. (9)
Therefore, we could address the consciousness of people without any particular reference. Whatever the metaphysical status of Geist, (10) we are now in a position to become phenomenological about the world. This is to say that there exists a relationship between consciousness and the objects it (they?) perceives. This philosophy would serve as the antecedent to Edmund Husserl's definition of phenomenology, the subject of our next contributor.
Edmund Husserl (b. 1859)
Husserl was born in Prostêjov, Moravia (which would later be a part of the Czech Republic). (11) In 1876, he enrolled in the University of Leipzig where he studied mathematics, physics, and astronomy. Husserl studied philosophy on the side. In 1878 he attended the Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Berlin while continuing his studies of mathematics and philosophy. It wasn't until he attended the University of Vienna that he received his Ph.D in mathematics in 1883. Husserl later began publishing a series of books as he went from university to university. He ended up at the University of Freiburg where he was eventually barred from any academic activity by the Nazis. (12)
Husserl's philosophy is characterized by his emphasis of consciousness and the relationship it holds to objects in the world. He believed that a perceiver could take in the experience of an object but only concentrate on the experience itself of what it is like to see, hear, touch, smell, or taste. This philosophy is called phenomenology and it borrows aspects from Descartes, Hegel, and Bretano. (13)
When the ego experiences objects of perception then, Husserl argued, one must not consider the metaphysical status of those objects. The ego need only enjoy the physical state of pleasure of the experience and "brackets" the objects it experiences (which Husserl called an epoche). This is where the philosopher of phenomenology must begin. As Solomon points out, phenomenology is ultimately all about
a very loose-knit system of problems, philosophers, and philosophies,
all of which are brought together only by the slack and ultimately vacuous
insistence that a first-person description, without theoretical bias, of
one's own consciousness of the world must precede all philosophical
theorizing. (14)
From the standpoint of having a conscious experience, one can begin experiencing what the world is all about (though this is not to be confused with empiricism). It is only from this primary starting point can the phenomenologist begin to assess his metaphysics. (15)
Soren Kierkegaard (b. 1813)
This Danish philosopher was born in Copenhagen, Denmark. He was initially trained by his father, Michael, and then was urged to enroll in the University of Copenhagen to study theology. While he was there, he developed a disdain for the philosophy of Hegel. For Kierkegaard, Hegelian philosophy neglected to explain what to do. At the death of his father he became a Lutheran pastor and became engaged to the young Regine Olsen. For personal reasons, he broke off the engagement with Olsen and left his station as pastor. He believed that institutional Christianity was too cerebral and too much about objective truths. Kierkegaard died in 1855. (16)
Kierkegaard presents us with a three-category view of human existence. Each category, or stage, is a progression toward achieving the virtues of meaning, purpose, and value in life. For Kierkegaard, the problem of life bespeaks the existence of God. The first category of existence is the aesthetic stage. On this level human beings are primarily concerned with personal gratification and living for self-complacency. This does not necessarily mean that the aesthetic man is a gross hedonist, rather, he is simply very circumspect about his life. Everything revolves around the aesthetic man. But Kierkegaard explains that this ultimately leads to unhappiness. Pursuers of meaning, purpose, and value, are ultimately compelled to arrive at the ethical stage. This category of man is the attempt of the "struggling individual" to find conformity in recognizing certain moral and absolute goods. The problem for the ethical man is that it, too, leads to despair. Such a man sees living the life of the ethical a fruitless task and an impossible achievement. The last stage and impending conclusion of the struggling individual is the religious stage. With the realization that the aesthetic man cannot bring happiness in personal pleasures and that the ethical man simply mirrors the problem of an infinite satisfaction in values (along the lines of Medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas), the next level requires a drastic "leap of faith" to the realization of the existence of God. This "irrational" step compels us to view the meaning, purpose, and value of life through the perspective of divine providence. In this sense the notion of truth is subjective because it is quite real to the perceiver. Solomon writes:
A "subjective truth" is a psychological truth about the author. The object
of the author's belief may be false, but it is true that the author has that
belief. This account could also explain how it is that "subjective truth" is
for only one person. (17)
God then becomes the source of ultimate
meaning and satisfaction and brings to the perceiver a deep sense of resolution
to the "struggling individual."
Friedrich Nietzsche (b. 1844)
Nietzsche was born in Röcken, Prussia to Ludwig and Franziska Nietzsche. After Nietzsche completed grade school, he began to experience a series of headaches that eventually led to his mental breakdown in 1889. (18) In 1864 he enrolled in the University of Bonn to study theology and linguistics. After one year, he abandoned his religious faith and moved to the University of Leipzig to continue studying linguistics. Nietzsche rapidly became an associate professor and, eventually, a full professor at the University of Basel having had no doctoral dissertation. In his final 11 years he suffered from insanity and remained in the care of his mother and sister. Nietzsche was said to have died either of a venereal disease, dejection, or a brain disorder inherited from his father.
Nietzsche's assessment of the human predicament is surprisingly similar to the Christian Kierkegaard in his affirmation that life is devoid of any objective meaning, value, or purpose. (19) We are usually reminded about Nietzsche's madman who runs in the street crying, "I seek God! I seek God!" The people at the marketplace present during this outburst laugh. Then, Nietzsche writes, "'Whither is God? he cried, 'I shall tell you. We have killed him--you and I. . . .God is dead . . .'" (20) The vocabulary here is clearly dictating the death of God, but the sense of his death is representative. That is, God is dead because tradition is veering away from tradition and the related Christian attachments. In this scenario envisaged by Nietzsche, the madman claims that he has arrived too early and that the actual death of God is still in process. Nietzsche acknowledges in his madman story that with the death of God comes the implications of atheism and nihilism. This nihilism is the destruction of all meaning and value in life in the absence of God. In fact, Nietzsche writes:
Our European culture is moving for some time now with a
tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade, as
toward a catastrophe: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river
that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid
to reflect. (21)
So, Nietzsche's view is that since modern thought recognizes the death of God and with it the death of tradition then life remains on the path to meaninglessness, devoid of value or purpose. Solomon adds:
Nihilism is not only the collapse of traditional values, it is the demand
for freedom from imposed values. (22)
Indeed, it is at this stage the human being must work from to produce her own path to meaning.
Jean-Paul Sartre (b. 1905)
Sartre is perhaps the most influential philosopher of the 20th century. The very name "Sartre" is virtually synonymous with existentialism. He was born in Paris to Jean-Baptiste and Anne-Marie Schweitzer Sartre. When Jean-Baptiste died one year after Jean-Paul was born, he and his mother moved in with her parents. Sartre used to frequent the study that was filled with books and began teaching himself how to read. At the age of 12 Sartre was a confirmed atheist. He then enrolled in École Normale Supérieure where he studied for the highest French degree possible. Sartre later served in the army and eventually lived a life of teaching and writing (both fiction and non-fiction). He, along with Merleau-Ponty and de Beavoir founded the journal Les Temps modernes. In 1964 he was offered the Nobel Prize for literature but had refused it. Sartre lived out his days writing and supporting political causes until his death in 1980. (23)
Having been influenced by Martin Heidegger, Sartre perceived "Being" in two states of existence: (i) being-in-itself, and (ii) being-for-itself. The "being-in-itself" represents a brute fact of reality, such as a rock or a flower. The latter, the "being-for-itself," is human consciousness that is free from a world where God exists. The "being-for-itself" rejects any values imposed on it by anyone else. Thus, the human individual must make external objects as well as other people a part of their own world. They must be made valuable to the perceiver. All objects in the world, particularly those that are "being-in-itself," are given an interpretive framework whereby they gain value and meaning in the world. Contrary to the medieval scholars, existence precedes essence. This means that we arrive in this world as a conscious being, but our worth is defined only by what we do to make it have worth. And we, as human beings, have the atheistic freedom to choose which value system to follow and to make all external objects have a purpose for our existence. In an imaginary dialogue with Sartre, Solomon posits this response by Sartre:
The question of freedom is a question of subjectivity, a question of how
the subject must see his own situation . . . Whether in fact one can do
it is not the question of freedom. It is rather a question of will. (24)
It is only in the situation where one is no longer under the constraints of a value system apart from the agent. Instead, one is genuinely free by virtue of acting in accordance with what will be done.
IV. THE FUTILITY OF TRADITIONAL VALUES WITHOUT GOD
We have surveyed a variety of thinkers including existentialists themselves and those who influenced existentialism. The common area of agreement between these thinkers tends to revolve around satiating the human need for determining their individual status in the world. (25) It is only in the pursuit of the individual as an individual or as a member of a class can we begin inquiry about such a person's sense of worth.
In a Hegelian world view one would seek their role in a pre-established world where history unfolds and we eagerly solicit our respective part. By contrast, Sartre would decry any pre-established role imposed on us by an external value system that does not appreciate our true freedom to choose such. Nietzsche would join in Sartre's nihilism exclaiming that traditional values no longer exist today because God and tradition have been executed by Man! Thus we are left with a world devoid of any imposed value system and can begin exploring our Sartrian liberty. Kierkegaard would not see the abolishment of traditional values. Instead, as was often the case, he would try to negotiate the "struggling individual" into accepting Christian theism because only this world view expresses a subjective truth so compelling that any rational or cerebral Christianity would overlook it. From Husserl's standpoint, the issue is not whether the truth exists in external values or in a subjectivist theory of truth. Rather, we must simply appreciate the experience our consciousness receives and forego any ontological disagreement about the external or internal world. Our existential significance will derive from the nature of our phenomenological experience.
But it seems that each existential perspective begins with the assumption that God does not exist or Christianity is not true. The only exception would be the Kierkegaardian standpoint of subjective truth. But even Kierkegaard disdained the apparent overuse of rational discourse with respect to theological issues. In our present age of analytical philosophy, I think that Sartre's message is precisely the direction we should not go. Our sense of humility, sacrifice, compassion, and so forth all require that we become a being-for-others and not a being-for-itself. It is not our role to create an existential framework and impose it onto the world in order to create meaning for ourselves. This would be to render others as a means-to-an-end, a view that no self-respecting Kantian would dare entertain. For the nihilist it is practically advantageous if no one else adopts this view. The nihilist would do well to convince others about the Golden Rule or Christian ethics so that their own needs and worth are protected while granting the person the liberty to choose a different course of action. As a matter of the theological significance in Kierkegaard's world view, I think that the revelation of God's existence can and is revealed to the seeker. But we should not be so apt to abandon the role of reason as did Kierkegaard. Only by utilizing reason can the Christian subjectivist convince others of her faith. Other people cannot partake of Kierkegaard's experience unless they are convinced that it is the veridical avenue to pursue. Why should the individual make the "leap of faith"? Perhaps the answer is more appropriated as: Is the Christian faith true? If we can satisfy the theoretical then we can subsequently assess the practical. It seems that a world where God does not exist permits one to arbitrarily and subjectively create a framework that one merely chooses for personal complacency. Any value that is without foundation is only as viable as the appetites and desires that people permit them to be. But are values so ephemeral that they are only as meaningful as what we make them? If so then what keeps others from creating a Hitler value system that maximizes the Sartrian concept of being-for-itself? It would seem that without an objective foundation, such as God, any proposed values would simply be futile.
In this essay, we have surveyed
existentialism and those who represent its tenets. Although existentialism is
not a monolithic world view, there are features that existentialists share.
We have seen how Hegel, Husserl, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre have impacted
existentialism and why each contribution shares a nugget of wisdom that presupposes
a status on the role of reason. Even though some of the representatives of those
surveyed in this essay are non-theists, the resolution that objective value
and meaning only make sense in a world where God exists as a source of traditional
values naturally presses us to consider whether or not it is factually true
that God exists.
_____________________________
END NOTES
2. Ibid.
3. See Jo Ann Boydston, The Later Works, 1925-1953: John Dewey, Volume 4 (Illinois: Southern Illinois University, 1988), pp. 21-39.
4. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 240.
5. Ibid., p. 241.
6. See an excellent synopsis of existentialism proper in Robert Solomon, Existentialism (New York: Random House, Inc., 1974).
7. Walter Kaufmann and Forrest E. Baird, Philosophic Classics Vol. IV: Contemporary Philosophy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), p. 1.
8. Ibid., p. 2.
9. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 4.
10. The transcendental aspect of Geist is not in dispute with Hegelian scholars. However, precisely how Geist becomes the embodiment of individual mind-souls is still a matter of debate.
11. Kaufmann and Baird, Contemporary Philosophy, p. 303.
12. Ibid., p. 304.
13. Franz Bretano was a former teacher of Husserl who greatly criticized British Empiricism. Bretano is responsible for establishing that consciousness is always about intention, which is to say that consciousness is always about something other than itself. See Ibid., p. 304.
14. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 161.
15. Ibid., pp. 162-74. To see how Husserl critiques other epistemological beginning points, see Quentin Lauer, ed., Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965), pp. 71-147.
16. Kaufmann and Baird, Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 129-30.
17. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 75.
18. Ibid., p. 243.
19. Ibid., p. 89.
20. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Gay Science," in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954), p. 95.
21. Nietzsche, "The Will to Power," trans. W. Kaufmann, in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, 2d. ed., ed. with an Introduction by W. Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, Meridian, 1975), pp. 130-131.
22. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, p. 87.
23. Kaufmann and Baird, Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 453-4.
24. Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism, pp. 288-89.
25. In the case of G. W. F. Hegel, one might properly consider their corporate status with respect to the conduit of history.
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