WHAT PRICE TOLERANCE? EVIDENCE FROM HINDUISM AND MOHANDAS K. GANDHI THAT TOLERANCE HAS ITS LIMITS.
by
Shandon Guthrie and Mario DelaRosa
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993 and 1996, the elections for the U. S. Presidency spawned debates about character and virtue not only for individuals destined to govern an entire country but for average citizens who interact with others on a daily basis. Accusations about "poor character" and "unethical standards" seemed to be paraded on virtually every talk show in one form or another. The infamous Heaven's Gate cult drew the attention of the entire nation as 39 men and women took their lives in an attempt to join their extra-terrestrial destiny in the tail of comet Hale-Bopp. Such controversies have centered essentially around one subject: Tolerance. Precisely how much is enough in regard to acting "appropriately" or within the borders of tolerance? In the following sections, we shall explore the subject of tolerance as it relates to three areas of social interaction. Following will be a section dealing with the limitations of tolerance and how Post-Modernist philosophy responds to it. Our final assessment of tolerance as a limited virtue will consider Hindu and Gandhian perspectives as focal points.
II. THE ETHICS OF TOLERANCE FROM A POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVE
by M. DelaRosa
Richard Rorty takes the spotlight usually reserved for French philosophers. He is one of the few English-speaking defenders of postmodernism and ranks alongside the continental symbols of Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault. He has been described, for example, as "one of the major U.S. philosophers of the postmodern movement".(1) In one of his books, The Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty's central issue concerns the abandonment of the "notion of discovering the truth which is common to theology and science."(2) He believes there is no way to step out of our culturally limited perspective to see how things really are in themselves.(3) Hence, for Rorty, our conceptual schemas, sciences, rationalities, and ethical beliefs all lack the absolute, objective grounding that the traditional philosophical project hoped to provide. Rorty considers himself to be the most recent exponent of a long anti-metaphysical tradition. He includes Nietzsche as one of his "heroes". He simply "drop[s] the notion that there is something called 'philosophical method' or 'philosophical technique' or 'the philosophical point of view.'"(4)
For Rorty, it is possible that democratic society can be divided in such a way that certain subgroups (ethnic, religious, or linguistic) find a continual exclusion from the rule of a majority group. And at the same time, those groups acknowledge that the "traditional search for cognitive and ethical foundations is abandoned" or "has not paid off."(5) The conflict of subgroup division is growing in significance today since a spirit of multiculturalism and sensitivity to ethnic differences are being affirmed in postmodern society. Thus we can think of these subgroup tensions as appealing to Rorty's "ethnocentrism".(6)
Rorty's conception of "us" is directly related to his anti-realism (this is literal realism). There is no absolute knowledge. In fact he argues, "truth is not out there waiting to be discovered."(7) Through our contingent use of language, we construct statements which we claim to be true. Rorty argues that there are no absolute standards such as "liberty, equality and fraternity"(8) which can be proclaimed as universally appropriate for all humanity. Rorty depicts a world of different societies, each claiming the loyalties of their members, each asserting its own moralities, and each distinguishing itself from others.
He appears to advocate a restricted form of ethnocentrism when he says that we should resist the temptations of cultural relativism. We should not feel embarrassed to condemn the views of others as "stupid, crazy or sinful".(9) Rorty's admission of "our" ethnocentrism rhetorically accomplishes three things.(10) First, he suggests that ethnocentrism is inevitable and that this view is evident in human nature. We are imperfect because we are ethnocentric. Second, if we are currently ethnocentric and we recognize our limitations, then this ethnocentrism is broad-minded (ethnocentric self-awareness leads to a recognition of each one of us as different). Third, "we" can compare favorably with others. Thus every possible we is admissible in its own sphere and, at the same time, self-consciousness leads to a sort of tolerance for others.
III. RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
by S. Guthrie
While many looked at the Heaven's Gate incident as a single event in a chain, some began to raise the issue of judgment. All too often individuals anesthetize themselves from the pangs of judgment, dismissing it as a system of personal attacks against other human beings. Religion has not been an exception to this. In fact, many have considered religion to be the primary impetus for judging others in both a correct and incorrect manner.
Mohandas K. Gandhi, the notable religio-political leader responsible for India's independence, often spoke of tolerance in religion. Those familiar with Hinduism in general are aware that tolerating others is its greatest trademark. The level of this tolerance is carried to such areas as belief in God as universally equivalent. That is, every religious system ultimately reveres the one and same God no matter what title, name, or attribute is ascribed. This is due to the idea that everything that lives owes its origin to the selfsame God. Gandhi makes this remark to a visiting American professor of theology:
The chief value of Hinduism lies in holding the actual belief that all life (not only
human beings, but all sentient beings) is one, i.e. all life coming from the universal
source, call it Allah, God or Parameshwara . . . . He has as many names as you can
possibly give Him.(11)
In a statement from Swami Vivekananda, quoted in Lewis Hopfe's Religions of the World, he makes the following observation about Hinduism:
I am proud to belong to a religion which has taught the world both tolerance and
universal acceptance. We believe not only in universal tolerance, but we accept
all religions as true. As different streams having different sources all mingle their
waters in the sea, so different paths which men take through different tendencies
various though they appear; crooked or straight, all lead to God.(12)
It would appear that Hinduism is a religion for all religions being the blanket for all walks of life. This may explain why a missionary field is vacant in the Hindu religion. On the other hand, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism continue to win the world over by fervently ministering to people in hopes of making future converts. This is something Hinduism finds unnecessary.
At this point it must be noted that Gandhi himself implicitly denied such a globalized ecumenicalism for all religions. It appears that although Gandhi maintained an equal status for all religions, he seemed to reject the idea that all religions possessed equal truth values. This can be illustrated in his autobiographical work where he makes the following comments:
Many Infallible Proofs were proofs in support of the religion of the Bible, as the
author understood it. The book had no effect on me. Parker's Commentary was
morally stimulating, but it could not be of any help to one who had no faith in
the prevalent Christian beliefs . . . the arguments in proof of Jesus being the only
incarnation of God and the Mediator between God and man left me unmoved.(13)
I saw no reason for changing my belief--my religion. It was impossible for me
to believe that I could go to heaven or attain salvation only by becoming a
Christian . . . My difficulties lay deeper. It was more than I could believe that
Jesus was the only incarnate son of God, and that only he who believed in him
would have everlasting life. . . . according to Christianity only human beings
had souls, and not other living beings, for whom death meant complete extinction;
while I held a contrary belief. . . . [Jesus was] not the most perfect man ever born.(14)
On the surface Gandhi apparently leans toward the Hindu notion of tolerance by accepting all religions as leading to the same deity. However, this quotation from his Autobiography gives us pause. Gandhi is advocating that alternative religions to Hinduism, particularly Christianity, are incorrect in their depictions of theological issues. Our reading of Gandhi has led us to the conclusion that he believed in a "right" religion and a "wrong" religion, abstractly speaking. That is, Gandhi embraces Hinduism as the religion of his culture, but he rejects Christianity, for example, as "contrary" to his own thoughts and beliefs.
It is very interesting to investigate Gandhi and his notion of tolerance for other religions. It appears that he means a tolerance of people, not a tolerance of creeds. For Gandhi, the Christian depictions of Jesus, the Bible, and soteriology are false. Perhaps Gandhi implies that Christianity ought to alter its strict doctrines to allow for other religions to be true. Whatever the real meaning behind Gandhi's disbelief in "prevalent Christianity" is, it remains true that as it currently stands it clearly is false for him. Therefore, it appears that tolerance does not encroach itself upon what is true. Hinduism or Christianity may be both true, both false, or one true and the other false, but this does not suggest that we place tolerance on such a high pedestal that we lose sight of what it means to accept what is true and to deny what is false.
IV. THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE
by M. DelaRosa
In setting out the limits of tolerance, reference has been made indifferently to dislike, disapproval, and disgust. It has been implicitly assumed that any or all of these may serve to define cases in which questions of toleration arise. However, there are important differences between the concepts. In particular, there are important differences between morally grounded disapproval and simple dislike, distaste, or disgust.
The discussion has supporters on both sides. In the first case Peter Nicholson writes:
We must see the moral idea of toleration solely in terms of disapproval, i.e. of the
making of judgments and holding of reasons over which argument is possible.
Toleration is a matter of moral choice, and our taste and inclinations are irrelevant.
No doubt, peoples's prejudices, their contingent feelings of liking or disliking, have to
be taken into account when one is trying to explain why they are tolerant or not; but
such feelings are not morally grounded, and cannot be the ground of a moral position.(15)
By contrast, Mary Warnock insists that toleration has a wider scope and may be displayed in cases where there is a simple dislike as well as in cases where there is moral disapproval. She remarks:
Often one could think oneself tolerant if one refrain from criticizing something
that one disliked, hated, or regarded with varying degrees of distaste... more fundamentally,
I simply do not believe that a distinction can be drawn, as Nicholson seeks to draw it,
between the moral and the non-moral, resting on the presumption that the moral is rational,
or subject to argument, the non-moral a matter of feeling or sentiment.(16)
The debate as to whether the limits of tolerance is such as to cover things of which we disapprove and things which we dislike is not merely confined to a verbal dispute. It is part of a general philosophical debate about the very status of moral judgments, the nature of distinctions between such judgments, and the nature of the distinction between such judgments and judgments of taste or preference. Mary Warnock insists that Nicholson's distinction cannot be sustained. In her opinion, part to the answer to the question "Ought this to be tolerated?" may come from the strong feeling aroused by the thing in question. "The intolerable" she says "is the unbearable". And we may simply feel, believe, and conclude without reason that something is unbearable and must be stopped".(17) On her view, there is no clear and decisive distinction between moral judgments which are based on reason and non-moral judgments which are based on feeling. On the contrary, moral judgments may themselves be based on strong feelings. This reflects a general philosophical speculation that moral judgments are not separated from judgments of taste by an unbridgeable divide. But of course it does not follow from this that no line can be drawn at all. Quite the reverse. She goes on to indicate her belief that a line can be drawn when she suggests that the toleration which involves moral disapproval should be termed strong toleration, whereas the toleration which involves only dislike should be termed weak toleration. The only provision being that the distinction between strong and weak toleration, like the distinction between disapproval and dislike, is not invariably clear and uncontroversial.
Another reason for favoring this wider scope is provided by what is sometimes known as value pluralism.(18) Like most philosophical theories, pluralism comes in many forms. However, in broad and general terms, pluralism interprets the moral world as consisting of distinct and often mutually incompatible (even incommensurable) values. They believe that a world in which values conflict has been eliminated and would be a poorer world than one in which conflicting values do exist. The reason for this is that pluralism dictates that the elimination of conflict often involves the elimination of things which are valuable. According to this theory there is no one set of virtues which is exhaustive, nor one set of values which is all-embracing. This, of course, is up for debate.
"The belief that all values can be reconciled, the belief that there is a single right answer to moral and political problems, generates tyranny and oppression."(19) On the other hand, pluralism requires toleration because it insists that not all values can be reconciled harmoniously. On a political level, this means that there is no single, utopian state in which all conflict is eliminated and where no value is lost. For example, the requirements of liberty and equality will conflict as will the demands of justice and of mercy. The pursuit of perfect justice will, of necessity, be to renounce mercy and vice versa.
For our purposes, this commitment to pluralism serves to clarify constructing toleration widely. We need to look at tolerance on an individual as well as on a political level for the belief that not all values can be reconciled applies here too. Thus pluralism dictates that no one person can possess all virtues and all good qualities: some virtues are such that the possession of them entails the absence of other, equally valuable (yet incompatible) virtues. If, with Plato, we assume the opposite and that all virtues can be reconciled, then this particular ground for toleration disappears. Most importantly, the reason for extending the scope of toleration to include limitations, or weaknesses, as well as moral vices, disappears. These two grounds for favoring a wider rather than a narrower scope for toleration are connected one to another in so far as they both depend upon the denial of a particular form of moral objectivity. Warnock denies the central features of a Platonic theory of morality according to which moral truth is rationally discoverable and internally consistent. In other words, she denies the assimilation of moral truth to factual truth, urging in the first case that moral judgments are not necessarily founded on reason but are felt. In the second case, moral values are not at all compatible one with another.
V. SOCIETAL TOLERANCE
by S. Guthrie
Ethical tolerance is paraded as the virtue of all virtues. It grants equal standing to each ethical theory until evidence is allotted that would give special status to one theory over another. So far we have experienced a post-Modern perspective of ethical tolerance against the backdrop of "anti-realism."(20) Whether or not post-Modernism claims a victory over previous Realist theories is for the reader to decide. However, when tolerance is translated to cultural and societal relationships then tolerance takes on a new challenge: How far should tolerance be maintained between rivals?
Those of us who read the historical accounts of Gandhi and India's liberation are well aware of the limits and price of tolerance. Gandhi pursued the goal of freedom for India but was unwilling to utilize violence as a medium. He believed that life in any form ought to be tolerated, no matter how sinister a rival may become. There is never a reason to take a life in the Gandhian perspective.(21)
But did Gandhi perceive a limit to tolerance of any sort? It seems that Gandhi did not tolerate several things that he considered impinging unjustly:
1) He did not tolerate atheism.(22)
2) He did not tolerate historic Christian doctrines.(23)
3) He did not tolerate a 12 schilling tax on the family.(24)
4) He did not tolerate Christian missionary schools.(25)
5) He did not tolerate the misuse of sexual relations.(26)
6) He did not tolerate violence against people.(27)
All of this is intended to demonstrate that societal tolerance has its limits and does not encroach upon what is right. For Gandhi, it would be absurd to suggest that one ought to be tolerant of violence or atrocious taxes. Unfortunately, many have come to believe that tolerance is some sort of all-encompassing virtue and ought to be sustained in even the most violent disagreements. But this is a patently absurd way of viewing it, even for Gandhi. Tolerance is simply the respect for the people who hold to unacceptable practices.
In a similar fashion, Hinduism has maintained a cultural diversity amongst its people. While some may suggest that Hinduism and Indian culture are inseparable, such "division" bespeak a clear indication that some differences are extant. We are told of the four caste systems that are granted certain specified duties (dharma):
1. Brahmanas (Brahmins) - the caste associated with teaching, studying, sacrifice, and the giving and accepting of gifts.
2. Kshatriya - the caste associated with protecting the people.
3. Vaishya - the caste associated with merchants, trading, agriculture, and protecting cattle.
4. Shudra - the caste with the sole duty of service without envy of others.(28)
The general source for one's placement into a specific caste is one's karma or "actions." Depending upon how benevolent one acted during a previous incarnation determines the level or caste in the current incarnation. Should one fail to properly pursue moral virtues, he or she becomes reincarnated in order to continue the proper life. Religiously, one is asked to reunite her individual soul with Brahman (the Universal God that pervades all life). This is achieved through various rituals, moral living, and meditation whereby the illusion of separation from Brahman is diminished.(29)
What is evident in this societal separation is that tolerance is limited to the value of life only and is not concerned with karma or violations of Hindu moral codes. These things cannot be tolerated in either a Gandhian or Hindu perspective, even when tolerance is given its highest exaltation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the notion of tolerance and how it is used in a religious, ethical, and societal manner. Even though Gandhi and the Hindu religion have exalted tolerance despite adversarial opposition, it has been demonstrated that even tolerance possesses its limits in regard to what is true and what is right. Tolerance, absolute or not, does not apply to every aspect of life.
END NOTES
1. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: 1988), p. 52.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. Thomas W. Clark, "Humanism and Postmodernism: A Reconciliation," The Humanist (January-February, 1993), p. 18.
4. Parusnikova Zuzana, "Is a Postmodern Philosophy of Science Possible?", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (1992, V. 23, No. 1.), p. 24. Quoted from Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: 1986), p. 392.
5. Clark, "Humanism", p. 19.
6. R. Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz", Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth.
7. "Nationalism and Richard Rorty: The Text as a Flag for Pax Americana", p. 73.
8. R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: 1989), p. 189.
9. Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism", p. 203.
10. Ibid., pp. 206 and 203.
11. M. K. Gandhi, The Essence of Hinduism, edited by V. B. Kher (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1987), p. 10.
12. "Swami" Vivekananda, quoted in Religions of the World, 6th edition, by Lewis Hopfe, edited by Lavinia R. Hopfe and Lewis M. Hopfe, Jr. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), p. 76.
13. M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography Or The Story of My Experiments With Truth (Ahmedabad, India: Navahvan Publishing House, 1927), p. 141.
14. Ibid., p. 155.
15. Peter Nicholson, "Toleration as a Moral Ideal" in Horton and Mendus (eds.), Aspects of Toleration (London: 1985), pp. 160-61.
16. Mary Warnock, "The Limits of Toleration" in Horton and Mendus (eds.) On Toleration (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 25-6.
17. Ibid., p. 126.
18. Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (Humanities Press, 1989), pp. 110-45.
19. Ibid., p. 125.
20. For a detailed critique of Richard Rorty's evaluation of "Technical Realism," see Shandon L. Guthrie, "A Critique of Richard Rorty and His Objections to 'Technical' Realism" at http://members.aol.com/berean7/docs/rorty.html.
21. Gandhi, The Essence of Hinduism, p. 99.
22. Gandhi, Autobiography, p. 79.
23. Ibid., pp. 141-43.
24. Ibid., p. 180.
25. Ibid., p. 227.
26. Ibid., p. 233.
27. Ibid., p. 319.
28. The Code of Manu, 1:88-91.
29. Cf. Hopfe, Religions of the World, p. 89.